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Abstract: 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to address the question of whether the actions a player performs 
within video games can be considered to matter in a moral sense.  Rather than basing my 
approach upon the possible influence that violent behaviour in video games may have upon 
the player’s behaviour, my focus in this thesis is restricted to considering the actions the 
player takes within the game entirely on their own merits, centring around the idea that 
although the situation encountered within a simulation is not real, the actions the player 
performs can still be considered as meaningful.  I first consider the responses that the 
normative theories of Consequentialism, Deontology and Virtue Ethics have to actions taken 
within video games.  Having established that the first two theories are primarily concerned 
with entities that possess moral standing, I turn to examining the reasons why video-game 
entities appear to lack this moral standing.  To do this, I consider the status of video-game 
entities in light of the fact they are not real, before turning to an examination of the player 
ceding responsibility for their moral decisions to the expectations of the game-world.  I 
conclude from this examination that there is little ability to justify classifying video-game 
entities as entities deserving of moral standing on their own merits.  Finally, I examine the 
reasons based in virtue ethics as to why a player should treat video-game entities as if they 
did have moral standing, concluding that a player is able to use the game as an opportunity to 
practice their own sense of morality. 
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